Albert Atkin Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference Introduction Although the index is one of the best known features of Peirce's theory of signs there is litde appreciadon of Peirce's theory of the index amongst contemporary philosophers of language. The prevailing view is that the interesdng early history of indexicals begins with Hans Reichenbach and his account of token-refiexivity (Reichenbach, 1947).' Reichenbach maintains that an indexical like 'P means something like "the utter of this token". Although this seems intuitive enough, Reichenbach's account is undermined by its failure to capture the content of what we take ourselves to be saying in using indexicals. For instance, when John says, "I am thirsty", we take the content of John's utterance to be that John is thirsty. The token-reflexive theory suggests that the content of John's utterance is that the utterer of the token T is thirsty. These two things are different. As for more current theories, David Kaplan's work (1969, 1978, 1979, 1989a and 1989b) provides the clearest account of indexical reference. Kaplan's account draws a famous disdncdon between character and content. Character is akin to a rule or simple linguisdc meaning such that the character of ' I ' is "the utterer, or agent of the context". Content on the other hand is the meaning that adses from applying that rule, or character, to a pardcular context. So, in a context where John says, "I am thirsty", applying the character of 'I ' to that context will yield John as content. But, applying the character of ' I ' to a context where I am the utterer or agent will yield me as content. In such cases, the character remains the same, but the content differs. Where, though, does Peirce's theory of the index fit into any of this? In short, there is no appreciadon of Peirce's theory in Kaplan's work, although Kaplan does show some awareness of Peirce. For instance, when explaining his use of the word "index" for words like "I", "here", "now" etc. Kaplan says: The term I now favor for these words is 'indexical'. Other audiors have used other terms; Russell preferred Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Winter, 2005, Vol. XLI, No, 1 162 Albert Atkin 'egocentric pardcular' and Reichenbach used 'token reflexive'. I prefer 'indexical' (which I believe is due to Pierce [sic]) because it is less theory laden than the others [...]. (Kaplan: 1989a, p. 490) The view implicit here is that whatever Peirce has to say about indexicals, it is less developed and less "theory laden" than other accounts. Consequendy, Peirce's preferred term, "index", is a safe terminological opdon.^ In retrospect, it is easy to see how this prevailing view of the history of indexicals and Peirce's place in it arises; current opinions are based almost endrely on the first generadon of philosophers interpredng Peirce's work, in pardcular, the pioneering work of Arthur Burks. Burks' (1949) work is one of the earliest and (sdll) most interesdng on indexicals and develops from of a cridcal analysis of Peirce's theory of signs. Unfortunately, Burks was wridng at a dme when we sdll did not have Rill access to Peirce's wridngs and consequendy, Burks' cridcisms of Peirce do not apply to our now more complete understanding of Peircian signs and indexicals.^ Although Burks was not wholly dismissive of Peirce's work, his analysis implies that much is wrong with Peirce's theory of the index. Sadly, this analysis, understandable from Burks' posidon, has passed on to a generadon of analydc readers who take it to mean that there is litde of value in Peirce's theory for their own projects.* Amongst the Peirce scholars condnuing Burks' pioneering, work the value placed on Peirce's theories is greater, and Thomas Goudge's excellent paper, "Peirce's Index" (Goudge, 1965), provides a pardcularly interesdng and sophisdcated reading of Peirce's theory. Unfortunately, Goudge's paper has failed to filter into the mainstream and replace the Burksian reading favored by analydc philosophers. The impact of Goudge's analysis within stricdy Peircian circles is considerably stronger and its importance is such that scholars sdll defer to it, rather than offer analyses of their own.^ However, despite marking a crucial milestone in our comprehension of Peirce's theory, Goudge's paper fails to reflect nuances in Peirce's theory that have become more obvious as our understanding of indices and indexical reference has grown over the last forty years. Time has now come, then, to develop the work that Goudge began and to provide an analysis to replace Burks' reading in the mainstream. I undertake this enterprise here. Goudge analyzes Peirce's theory by examining the various features Peirce claimed indices have. I take Goudge's strategy as my stardng point and begin, in secdon one, by looking at important features from Peirce's texts. I compare my findings with Goudge's before poindng out problems with his overall strategy. I take these problems to mean that we must look for a broader reading. I show what such a reading should look like in the two remaining secdons of the paper. In secdon two, I develop a three-fold disdncdon based on indexical ftincdon within proposidons. In secdon three, I analyze and develop Peirce's disdncdon Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 163 between genuine and degenerate indices. I then go on to apply this disdncdon to the three types of index idendfied in secdon two. Throughout this reading, I look at the combinadon of these aspects of the index and the implicadons this has for our understanding of Peirce's theory. Defining the Index Peirce's account of the index is part of his famous theory of signs, and in pardcular, his famous disdncdon between Icons, Indices, and Symbols. Before we begin to look in more detail at Peirce's account of the index though, we need some cursory definidons of these concepts. First, Peirce defines a sign as: something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. (CP 2.228 (1897)) Then, depending on how the sign stands for its object in its creadon of an interpretant, it will be either an icon, an index, or a symbol. For instance, if the sign stands for its object through some quality, then the sign is an icon. For example, if I use a small color sampler to demonstrate to a potendal buyer the color of my car, then the color sampler stands as a sign for the color of my car because of a quality it has, its color. But, if a sign is an index, it must stand for its object through some existendal or physical fact. For example, smoke acts as a sign for fire because of the causal connecdon between the two; when a fire is blazing, it has the physical effect of producing smoke. This physical connecdon enables us to use smoke as a sign for the presence of fire. And finally, if a sign stands for its object through some convendon, then the sign is a symbol. For example, at traffic lights (in some countries at least) a red light signals to the driver that they have no priority and must stop. However, this connecdon between the red light and what it stands for relies upon convendon; we might have taken blue lights to signify a lack of priority instead. Although all of these concepts will feature in what follows, we are most interested in the index, and in pardcular, Peirce's more precise account of it. Throughout his work, Peirce makes repeated attempts to idendfy the principle feauires of the index. The following five claims summarize the most important of these: 1) Indices use some physical condguity with their object to direct attendon to that object.* 2) Indices have their characterisdcs independendy of interpretadon.'' 164 Albert Atkin 3) Indices refer to individuals.' 4) Indices assert nothing.' 5) Indices do not resemble, nor do they share any lawlike relation with, their objects.'" The first feature, which we shall call the significatory feature, concerns the semiotic function of the index and has two components. Since semiosis, that is the act of signifying, consists of a sign that signifies its object (the sign-object relation), and generates a further sign to signify that object (the sign-interpretant relation), the first feature refiects this, Consequendy, the significatory feature has two components, physical contiguity and attention directing, which we shall look at in detail shortly. Before we begin though, we need to note that the notion of some physical contiguity between the index and its object corresponds to the sign-object relation, and the notion of a sign directing attention to its object corresponds to the sign-interpretant relation. The first of these two components, the physical contiguity between a sign and its object, corresponds to the connection between an indexicai sign and its object. For instance, smoke as a sign of fire is indexicai because the relationship between the sign and its object rests upon some physical connection, i.e., the fire causes thz smoke. The second of the two components, the sign's directing attention to its object, needs a litde clarification. The notion of directing attention seems to imply that the interpreter's attention must focus directly upon the object of the index. This, however, need not be the case. For instance, I can interpret smoke as a sign of fire from many miles away, i.e. with no focus or attention directed on the fire itself Rather, in generating an interpretant sign, smoke as an index merely suggests the presence or existence of its object. In directing attention towards its object, the index does not generate or characterize the object for our understanding as it would if we were attending the characteristics of the object itself. Instead, the interpretant of an index is just our understanding that the sign is standing for some object, nothing more. When we see smoke, it is only meant to direct our attention to the presence of fire, rather than to an understanding of the fire being, say, a forest blaze or a smoldering pile of car tires; this kind of understanding will come at some later point in a chain of interpretant signs that follows. These two components of the significatory feature, then, must ain together in order to make the semiotic function of the index clear. Within the overall process of a sign standing for an object and generating an interpretant, the index relies upon physical contiguity between it, as a sign, and its object in order to generate an interpretant. The interpretant generated by an index relying upon the contiguity between it and its object is one that draws attention to the presence or existence of its object. The second feature, that indices have their characteristics independently of Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 165 interpretadon, is slighdy less complicated than the first and concerns the reality of the index. We shall call this feature the independence feature. Peirce states that "an index [...] is a real thing or fact which is a sign of its object [...] quite regardless of its being interpreted as a sign" (CP 4.447 (1903)), i.e. its existence is independent of our interpredve pracdces. As an example, think again of smoke as an index of fire. Whether I, or any person, is there to interpret the smoke as a sign of fire is wholly irrelevant to die connecdon between the sign and its object; that connecdon sdll exists whether I am there to note it or not. This characterizadon is related to Peirce's account of "the real" or of what is existent as "that which is not whatever we may happen to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think it" (CP 8.12 (1871)). For Peirce, since an index's connecdon with its object does not rely upon the presence of an interpredng mind, an index is real. The third feature, that indices refer to individuals, concerns the nature of the index and the kind of object for wfiich it stands. Consequendy, we shall call this feature the singularity feature. For Peirce, the object of an index must be an individual thing.^^ For instance, the sky-track left by a jet plane is an index of that pardcular individual jet plane. So too with smoke and fire; a particular plume of smoke is an index of a particular fire. However, Peirce includes amongst the individual things that count as objects, "single collecdons of units or single condnua" (CP 2.306 (1901)). This implies that if a sign, on a pardcular occasion, is an index of many objects, the nature of the index-object reladonship means that we treat the collecdon of objects as an individual. For instance, a news network's traffic helicopter hovering above a major road is an index of a single traffic jam, but not an index of each separate stadonary car of the thousands trapped in gridlock, even though they go to make up the traffic jam. The fourth feature, that indices assert nothing, is one that Peirce makes frequent attempts to characterize. We shall call this feature the indicatory feature, for the reason that although Peirce says that indices assert nothing, a more posidve version of his claim is that all indices show or indicate their objects rather than describe them. He says, for instance, that an index offers no descripdon of its object (CP 1.369 (1885)), or that it has nothing to do with meanings (CP 4.56 (1893)). Generally, then, the fourth feature concerns the semandc impact of indices. Common to all of Peirce's attempts to define this feature is the claim that indices show their object rather than describe it. For Peirce, an index is purely denotative; it refers to its object without describing that object. The fifth and final feature, which we shall call the phenomenological feature, concerns the index's categorical status. The idea that an index does not resemble or share a law-like reladon with its object confirms the brute existence or secondness of the reladon between the index and its object. A reladon of resemblance is iconic and classifies the sign as a first. A law-like connecdon between a sign and its object is symbolic and classifies a sign as a third. Since the index has no important iconic or symbolic connecdon with its object, it is a 166 Albert Atkin second. This is not to say that the index has no iconic or symbolic connecdon at all, only that any such features play no part in an index's standing for the object it does. For instance, a footprint in the sand is an index of the person that left it imprinted upon the beach. Although it clearly shares some qtialides of resemblance with its object, the shape and size of the foot and so on, this is not important. WTiat makes the footprint a sign of its object is the brute existence of its object and the causal reladonship that exists between them. This makes the footprint an index, Goudge's Approach to the Features Attempting to detail and explain the features of the index as one finds them in Peirce's wridngs is the orthodox approach to take. For instance, Thomas Goudge's paper "Peirce's Index" (1965) takes precisely this approach. What is interesdng is that in all but minor detail, Goudge idendfies the same features in Peirce's discussion of the index as I do. Goudge says, for example. In addidon to its role as an idendfying sign, Peirce mendons the following six points: (1) An index has a direct physical connecdon with its object, or is really affected by that object, and the interpredng mind has nothing to do with the connecdon except take note of it (1,372; 2,248; 2.299), (2) An index exerts a compulsive infiuence on its interpreter, forcing him to attend to the indicated object. (3) An index involves the existence of its object, so that they form an inseparable pair. (4) The object is always an individual endty. (5) An index asserts nothing but only shows its object (3.361). (6) It also shows the reladonship between itself and its object to be a non-radonal reladon, a brute fact or Secondness. (Goudge: 1965, 53-54) Although in some cases the emphasis and wording differ,'^ Goudge's analysis and my own are idendcal in all but one case. The significatory feature of my account looks at two components of the index as it fi.incdons semiodcally. Goudge treats these two components as two separate features, failing to note that they are both part of the single process of a sign standing for an object and generadng an interpretant and so should be treated together; this also accounts for his idendfying six features in Peirce's texts where I only idendfy five. A benefit of my interpretadon over Goudge's is that it explains and addresses a problem both he and Burks (1949) see in Peirce's account. Goudge's discussion of the physical connecdon between an index and its object involves a lengthy discussion of the importance of causality to the Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 167 significatory feature. This includes a discussion of Burks' (1949) cridcism that Peirce confiises causadon and semiosis. We, however, benefit from keeping in mind the semiodc ftincdon of the index in our treatment of physical connecdon. The disdncdon between these two approaches is illustrated in an example of Christopher Hookway's (Hookway: 1985, pp. 122-24). Hookway points out that in the case of a bark-stripped tree as an index for the presence of deer, the following two statements are not equivalent: (1) The deer produced the stripped bark on the tree and (2) The stripped bark is a sign of the presence of the deer Statement (1) is dyadic and describes a causal reladonship, whereas (2) captures the possibility that the stripped bark can generate an interpretant. Goudge's reading commits us to treadng indices as explanadons like (1) and attempdng to explain interpretant generadon from a dyadic reladonship.'^ Further, being committed to explanadons like (1) complicates cases like the Pole Star as an index of the North where there is no dyadic or causal relationship between an index and its object. Our reading is not committed to dyadic readings of the index and avoids both of the difficuldes that Goudge's reading faces. First, it nullifies Burks' complaint by poindng out that he is relying on an abstracted nodon of physical connecdon;'* the two components of semiosis are only separable as an exercise in abstracdon. Also, it can handle non-causal cases by nodng, along with Hookway, that although explanadons like (1) might play some background or suppordng role to statements like (2), they need not. The Completeness of Goudge's Approach Aside from the slight differences in the way that we treat the features of the index as we find them in Peirce's wridngs, Gotidge and I differ more radically in another respect. Whereas Goudge sees the features as being IPdrcc's theory of the index, I think that there is more to Peirce's account than an enumeradon of the important features suggests. What that something more is, will be the subject of the next two major secdons of this paper. Here though, I first want to discuss the shortcomings of a Goudge-like approach, and the modvadon behind my move to develop a broader account. Throughout his paper, Goudge details each feature of Peirce's analysis of the index in turn, along with a discussion of whether or not that definidon includes or excludes those things that we naturally think of as indices. The consequence of this approach is that we find a whole variety of anomalous cases, i.e. cases which do not seem to fit the definidons of an index, but which we nevertheless feel inclined to include. For instance, Goudge suggests that indices, pardcularly words like "this" and "that" etc., do not really conform to the second of the 168 Albert Atkin features that he idendfies, i.e., that an index exerts a compulsive influence upon its interpreter to attend to the object (Goudge: 1965, p. 57). It is true that Peirce uses the idea of compulsion to express this feature of the index in his analysis. Goudge is also correct in suggesdng that it is hard to see that many indices do necessarily have a compulsive influence upon an interpreter. For instance, smoke, as an index of fire, does not compel me to form an interpretant sign of its object. After all, I could simply fail to nodce the fire despite the presence of smoke. I may choose to ignore it or even mistake the smoke for steam and so fail to recognize the fire as the cause of the sign. On Gotidgc's analysis, then, the second feature that he idendfies appears to lead to problems; some intuidve instances of indices do not accord with it. This suggests, to Goudge, that there is a problem with Peirce's account; the features that Peirce idendfies seem to exclude some instances that we would ordinarily count as indices. My own approach to these anomalies in Peirce's account though is this: Goudge is right, there are signs that we are inclined to call indices that do not fit well with the idendfied features. But where Goudge thinks that this is a problem that uldmately undermines the success of Peirce's theory, I think that such anomalous cases are less worrying and only appear to be problemadc if one attaches the same overall significance to them as Goudge does. For Goudge, the idendfied features are necessary and sufficient condidons that a sign must fulfill to count as an index. Consequendy, if a sign that we feel is an index fails to flilfill these condidons, then we have to suspect that there is something wrong with the theory that provides them. However, I think that Goudge's approach is wrong; we should not treat the idendfied features as necessary and sufficient condidons. Rather, we should see them as guiding principles, or rules of thumb. My reasons for thinking that Peirce intends us to take the features as rules of thumb stem, inidally, from his atdtude towards the possibility of idendfying a pure index. Peirce states that "it would be difficult if not impossible to instance an absolutely pure index, or to find any sign absolutely devoid of indexical quality" (CP 2.306 (1901)). The features, then, are somediing that an "ideal index" would have, but that few indices encountered in our day-to-day interacdons will fulfill without excepdon. Further, the main sources for the features come from a range of Peirce's wridngs; in pardcular, speculadve musing in correspondences, introductory lectures and even preliminary sketches designed for his introductory logic texts. These sources often provide details that we inidally label "essendal" or "crucial" in order to aid our understanding but whose importance is later qualified as our knowledge develops. Enumeradng characterisdc features for the index is perhaps a means of giving us some preliminary acquaintance with more complex ideas. Finally, there is evidence of Peirce's inclinadon to "define" terms via guiding principles (rather than with necessary and sufficient condidons) in his other work. Risto Hilpinen (Hilpinen: 1995, pp. 273-274) idendfies Peirce's use of this Peirce on the Index and Indexicai Reference 169 method when defining "assertion", and labels it, "the method of ideal examples". Hilpinen quotes the following passage from The Collected Papers: What is the nature of assertion,' We have no magnifyingglass that can enlarge its features, and render them more discernible; but in default of such an instrument we can select for examination a very formal assertion, the features of which have purposefiilly been rendered very prominent, in order to emphasize its solemnity. (CP 5.546 (cl908)) Just as Peirce takes "assertion" in its most formal and idealized setting in order to identify its most important feature, its solemnity, he is arguably applying the same idealization to the index. Instead of providing necessaiy and sufficient conditions, Peirce is using "the method of ideal examples" to look at those cases that most clearly display or exaggerate the main features. If we take the features of the index as part of a "method of ideal examples", then we can better accept the presence of indices that do not fit the idealized type than we can if we take the features to be a list of conditions that a sign wwrtRilfill to be an index. Clearly, the method of ideal examples is a legitimate approach to those features of the index available from Peirce's texts. What should also be dear is that this method, by itself, does nothing to explain how the anomalous cases that Goudge points out are to count as indices. After all, on what grounds are the anomalies to be included as indices if not by fit with the features? We need some explanation of why the problem cases that Goudge identifies, like subject terms and so on, are rightflilly included as indices in Peirce's theory. This suggests that we require a broader reading of Peirce's theory than the definition-centered account of Goudge provides; the remainder of this paper is just such a reading. The Subject Index The first step towards a broader reading of Peirce's theory comes, I believe, from looking at his desire to treat the subject term of a proposition as an index. Goudge and Burks both think that this is a problem, but Peirce's insistence upon this point suggests that it is more than an ad hoc move to keep his theories of hecceity, existence and the index unified.'^ Instead, Peirce seems aware that the subject term need not be an index proper, but rather that: "every subject partakes of the naaire of an index, in that its fi.inction is the characteristic fiinction of an index, that of forcing attention upon its object" (CP 2,357 (1902)). Peirce does not think that subject terms must always display »//of the features of an index in order to partake of an index. Further, Peirce identifies three ways in which the subject may partake of an index, and so identifies three t)'pes of subject-index. Every subject of a proposition, unless it is either an 170 Albert Atkin Index (like the environment of the interlocutors, or something attracdng attendon in that environment, as the poindng finger of the speaker) or a Sub-index (like a proper name, personal pronoun or demonstradve) must be a Precept, or Symbol, not only describing to the Interpreter what is to be done, by him or others or both, in order to obtain an index of an individual (whether a unit or a single set of units) of which the proposidon is represented as meant to be true, but also assigning a designadon to that individual, or if it is a set, to each single unit of the set. Undl a better designadon is found, such a term may be called a Precept. (CP 2.330(1903)) Clearly, then, Peirce idendfies three types of subject index: the index, the sub-index and, finally, the precept, which also partakes of the nature of an index in order to fi.incdon as a sign for its object. I maintain that by using these three types of subject-index, and showing how and why they do not all have the five idendfied features yet remain an index on Peirce's account is the beginning of a broader reading. In what follows, I shall treat each subject-index in turn and explain each in terms of the five features. Further, in the case of sub-indices and precepts, I shall show why Peirce has legidmate cause for treadng them as types of indices. The Index The index simpliciter is the kind of sign that ftilfills all or most of the definidonal features. The kinds of cases that Peirce has in mind are: "natural signs and physical symptoms [or] a poindng finger" (CP 3.361 (1885)). Another favorite is the weathercock as an index of the wind's direcdon (CP 2.286 (1893)). We can see that the weathercock is an index proper by nodng that it exemplifies all five of the features. First, the weathercock exemplifies the significatory feature because a physical condguity between it and its object, the wind, directs our attendon to that same object. The weathercock, or the direcdon in which it points, uses a causal connecdon between itself and the wind in virtue of which our attendon is drawn to the presence and direcdon of the wind. Second, the weathercock exemplifies the independence feature; the direcdon of the weathercock is totally independent of my interpredng it as an index of the wind. Clearly, the weathercock would sdll point westward whether I interpret that as a sign that the wind is blowing from the east or not. Third, the weathercock exemplifies the singularity feanire by being an index of an individual object, or at least, an object treated as an individual. The wind that the weathercock refers to is that pardcular wind that causes the weathercock to point in the direcdon that it does. Fourth, the direcdon of the weathercock does Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 171 nothing more than indicate the direcdon or presence of the wind; it offers no other descdpdon of the wind in order to indicate it and so exemplifies the indicatory feature. Finally, the weathercock exemplifies the phenomenological feature since the essendal connecdon between the direcdon of the weathercock and its object is down to the bnite existendal connecdon between it and the wind. Any resemblance or law-like reladon with its object is coincidental and not the essendal connecdon between sign and object. Clearly then, those signs displaying all of the features, nattiral signs, physical symptoms, poindng fingers and so on, count as indices. 777e Sub-Index The next proposidonal subject-index, from (CP 2.330 (1903)), is the subindex. Chief exemplifiers of the sub-index are proper names, indexical expressions like "I", "he", "she", and demonstradves like "this" and "that". What marks the difference between the sub-index and the index proper is that the sub-index has a strong symbolic content. For instance, on one occasion Peirce also calls the subindex a "Hypo-Seme" (CP 2,284 (1902)) in an attempt to suggest that this kind of sign is the indexical equivalent of the hypo-icon, a variant of the iconic sign. The hypo-icon is a sign that represents its object through resemblance or similarity, just as an ordinary icon does, but the resemblance rests largely upon convendon. For instance, the map of London's Underground train system represents its object iconically, the direcdon in which the lines run and the arrangement of stadons upon them is the same on the map as it is in the London Subway. However, these "similarides" are actually agreed upon by convention and fi.incdon iconically in virtue of a strong symbolic component; Regent's Park and Oxford Circus do both lie upon the Bakerloo line but they are more than a few cendmeters apart. So, just as the hypo-icon is an iconic symbol, its indexical cousin, the sub-index is an indexical symbol. As we should suspect, the symbolic component of the sub-index affects the number of features it exemplifies. For instance, since symbols are largely a matter of habit and convendon, they have their characterisdcs in virtue of our agreement about how to interpret them. This means that the sub-index does not clearly exemplify the independence feature, that indices have their character independendy of interpretadon. Further, symbols share a law-like reladon with their objects and so sub-indices do not clearly exemplify the phenomenological feature, that indices do not resemble, or share a law-like reladonship with, their object. This failure to exemplify the independence and phenomenological features is barely surprising though given what we already know about the way some of the things that count as sub-indices work. Take the sub-index "I", for instance; the reladonship between this sign and its object rests on a law or rule (something like Kaplan's nodon of "character" (Kaplan: 1989a, p. 505) where one kind of meaning for "I" is the rule " T refers to the speaker or writer") that states the object of the sign is its utter. What is more, language users agree upon 172 Albert Atkin this law-like reladonship, and so it exists largely as a matter of convendon and habitual use. In short then, the indexical feattires that the sub-index lacks merely reflect what we already know and think about terms like "I", "here", "now", "this" and "that" etc. What then of the remaining features? Take, for instance, the sub-index "that"; when I use "that" in the utterance "that is red", I am relying upon some physical condguity between my tokening of "that" and, say, a London Bus in order to direct attendon to the object. This is the significatory feature, that indices use a physical connecdon widi their object to direct attendon to that object. The singularity feature, that indices refer to individuals, may seem, inidally, beyond the reach of the sub-index, given the generality it inherits from its symbolic component. However, each tokening of z sub-index refers to a pardcular individual even if the sub-index considered as a general symbol does not. For instance, although two people both use the sub-index "I", with its general rule, they both use it to refer to different individuals, i.e. themselves, because their tokenings are different. For the sub-index to refer to individuals, it is the subindex considered as a token, rather than as a general type, that is crucial. Finally, the sub-index also exemplifies the indicatory feature, that indices assert nothing, or merely show their object. Take, again, "that"; when I use it to refer to an object, it only indicates the object. It does not offer any informadon about the object, nor does it describe its object in order to designate it; it simply directs attendon. Sub-indices, then, have the generality of symbols, but they are able to circumvent that generality and show their object on a pardcular occasion of use. Of the five idendfied features, they exemplify the significatory, the singularity, and the indicatory features. What is also of interest about the sub-index and the presence of these three features within it is that it provides an argument against the strict definidonal approach of Goudge, and his complaints about Peirce's inclusion of subject terms as indices generally. Peirce states, quite readily at (CP 2.284 (1903)) that the sub-index is not an index proper because of its general features. Further, the kind of signs that count as sub-indices, token-reflexives and so on, have a good case for inclusion as indexical expressions. Peirce seems to be ftilly aware of this. It would seem, then, that Peirce is not working to a definidonal list in his wider account of indices and indexical expressions. If he was, it is unlikely that he would attempt to treat sub-indices as indexical, since he is clearly aware of their indexical shortcomings. Precepts The final subject-index is the precept. The precept is often treated as any proposidonal subject that is not an index proper or simple indexical expression, like a pronoun.'* This includes descripdons, common nouns and quandficrs; however, Peirce makes a useful disdncdon between two types of precept; the direcdonal and the selecdonal. At (CP 2.288 (1895)), Peirce says: "some indices Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 173 are more or less detailed direcdons for what the hearer is to do in order to place himself in direct experiendal or other connecdon with the thing meant". This is the directional precept, examples of which include common or class nouns and definite descripdons. Peirce then condnues: "along with such indexical direcdons of what to do in order to find the object meant, ought to be classed those pronouns which should be endded selecdve pronouns, because they inform the hearer how he is to pick out one of the objects intended" (CP 2.289 (1895)). This is the selecdonal precept, examples of which include the universal and existendal quandfiers. Jhe Directional Precept The modvadng idea behind Peirce's treatment of direcdonal precepts as indices appears to be that at the point where the direcdons terminate and an object is designated, some form of indexical expression must be used. For instance, the subject-index of the utterance, "the car in my garage is blue", is the definite descripdon, "the car in my garage". The indexical nature of this definite description, on Peirce's account, appears to be that it provides direcdons which, if you follow them, will place you in the context of an object, and that object is blue. With regards the five idendfied features, the precept, like the sub-index, contains a strong symbolic element. For instance, if we analyze "the world's richest man wears glasses" as a list of direcdons leading to Bill Gates with a final declarative, "and that man wears glasses", there must be some convendon or agreement about how the list is compiled or derived from its corresponding definite description. This symbolic component means that the direcdonal precept fails to exemplify the independence feature, that indices have their character independendy of interpretadon, and the phenomenological feature, that indices do not resemble or share any law-like reladon with their object. This is because any sign with a strong symbolic component must lack these rather and-symbolic features of the index. The extent to which the direcdonal precept exemplifies the remaining definidonal features is not altogether clear. The reason is that in many respects, the direcdonal precept exemplifies the same features as the sub-index, namely the significatory feature, singularity feature and the indicatory feature. However, it does so in a way that requires some qualificadon. With the significatory feature, that an index uses some physical condguity with its object to direct attendon to that object, it seems clear that the directions are intended to make a hearer attend to an object. However, just how far we can insist that this is because of a physical connecdon is not clear. For instance, the definite description "the assassin of Kennedy", considered as direcdonal should, if followed, lead us to Lee Harvey Oswald. In direcdng us, as the hearer, to its object, "the assassin of Kennedy" also directs our attention to that object. However, if I use "the assassin of Kennedy", it seems hard to say I am using some physical connection between my 174 Albert Atkin utterance and Oswald to direct your attention, since no such connection exists. The problem is that there is no object present when I make this utterance. Similarly with the singularity feature, that indices refer to individuals. In cases like definite description where a unique object satisfies the description, then it seems the directional precept does refer to an individual, but in the case of common or class nouns, it is more difficult to treat the directional precept as exemplifying this feature. We can of course point out that Peirce wants to treat sets or continua as individuals (CP 2.307 (1901)). The problem, however, is that although class nouns like "horse" or "cadmium" could count as individual classes, it is not clear that the directional precept refers to them. Rather, we are directed to an individual, class or otherwise, since no object is present at the time of the utterance, and this, of course, is different from saying that an object is referred to. Finally, the indicatory feature, that indices assert nothing and merely show their object, is also a litde unclear. It seems straightforward that directional precepts use a range of descriptions and potential definitions for an object, however, these are only meant to assist or result in showing the object, not defining or describing it. Unfortunately, assisting or resulting in showing, is not the same as just showing. So, although the directional precept's use of descriptions and so on in directing attention does not contribute to the meaning of its object, it doesn't show its object either, since no object is present to show. The issue then, in the precept's exemplification of all of these feaUires is that the object and the direct experience of it are not necessarily present in the directional instructions themselves. Consequently, it is not the directions themselves that are indexicai, but the actions and experiences that result from following them. This is of course what Peirce intends for the precept; it is meant to instruct us in finding an indexicai episode rather than simply being one. What this does, though, is open a small gap between the indexicality of the precept, and indexicality as the list of features implies it. A better way to understand this gap is to think of the following paraphrase of the three definitional features that the precept exemplifies as a more accurate reflection of the way the precept works: 1) *The indexicai experience that results from following the directional instructions uses some physical contiguity with its object to direct attention to that object. 3) *The indexicai experience that results from following the directional instructions refers to individuals. 4) *The indexicai experience that results from following the directional instructions asserts nothing. Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 175 The paraphrase required hopefi.illy shows the difficulty in saying that direcdonal precepts themselves exemplify the original list of features for the index; the object is not clearly present in the utterances themselves. However, it should also be clear that the precept is meant to result in an indexical experience, and that it is from this intended result that its denotadve power is supposed to come. Although the direcdonal precept, according to Peirce, generates the indexical experience of its object and so has some claim on exemplifying three of the indexical features, it is not uncontroversial to count it as a type of index. Goudge, for instance, notes the presence of direcdons-to-find-an-object in Peirce's theory but finds them problemadc (Goudge: 1965, p. 64). Goudge claims that direcdons can only be indexical in cases where they contain an indexical term like "here", as in the instmcdon "press thumb here to open". Unfortunately, this misconstrues Peirce's nodon of direcdonal precepts. Goudge's examples are instnictions for cases where the object is present, and so are not precepdve at all. However, these are the only cases of direcdonal indices that Goudge is prepared to count as indexical. I, however, think that Peirce's account of direcdonal precepts as indices is not as alien as Goudge takes it to be. In an explanadon of precepts and how they work, from (CP 2.330 (1903)), Peirce clearly treats direcdonal precepts as something like procedural lists that end with the designadonal statement "and that object is X". Peirce's own example is "Lithium" which he treats as a list of instrucdons for the chemical isoladon of the substance with the final line "and the material of that is a specimen of lithium". Described this way, the nodon of direcdonal precepts sounds very like Kaplan's Dthat (Kaplan: 1978) or Evans' Descripdve names (Evans: 1982). Clearly, Kaplan and Evans use definite descripdons whereas Peirce uses direcdons, but the differences are not so great.'^ Kaplan says that "If poindng can be taken as a form of describing, why not take describing as a form of poindng.>" (Kaplan: 1978, p. 24). The precept captures the same insight; for Peirce, poindng is a form of direcdng attendon, and so direcdng attendon is serviceable as a form of poindng. I take it, then, that just as Dthat, on Kaplan's analysis, is a singular term and form of demonstradve, it is plausible that direcdonal precepts too are indexical signs. 7l7e Selectional Precept On Peirce's account of the precept as subject-index, the selecdonal precept differs from the direcdonal precept. Wliere the direcdonal precept gives direcdons that terminate at an experience of the object, the selecdonal precept includes the addidonal step of informing the hearer how, or by whom, an object is selected from a specified class. Examples of the selecdonal precept are the universal and existendal quandfiers."* The way in which the selecdonal precept encompasses quandfier phrases is roughly as follows. Expressions of universal quantification, all, eveiy, and so on. 176 Albert Atkin are statements to the effect that the hearer may select any object he wishes to from the universe of discourse, and the utterer guarantees that it will have the property predicted of all objects in the class. For example, my utterance of the expression, "All horses are hoofed" is my guarantee to you that you may select any horse you wish to and it will have hooves. The universal quandfier places the selecdve burden upon the hearer, as it were. Existendal quandfiers on the other hand, are statements that guarantee to the hearer that the utterer can find an object in the universe of discourse that sadsfies the property predicated of it. For instance, the expression "some horses are shod" is my guarantee that I can find horses with horseshoes. Here the selecdve responsibility lies with the speaker. This reading of quandfiers as the interplay between utterer and hearer is Peirce's early version of Game-Theoredc semandcs later developed by Jaako Hindkka."' Concerning the five idendfied features, the selecdonal precept exemplifies the same characterisdcs as the direcdonal precept. Just like the direcdonal precept, it is a symbol with indexical fijncdon and so cannot exemplify those features which state the non-symbolic nature of indices, Furdier, it exemplifies the significatory, the singuladty and indicatory features in the same way as the directional precept, i.e. obliquely or with some qualificadon. The reason is that the selecdonal precept, just like the direcdonal, implies a list of direcdons to find an object. The difference lies in the selecdonal precept's inclusion of a final, object selecdng, direcdon. For instance, the nodon of a list in the case of selecdonal precepts works roughly as follows: taking the universal quandfier as an example, its list of direcdons, with a final selecdonal instrucdon, may run "if you take all of the X's, and you pick out any one of the X's you fancy, it is guaranteed that that pardcular X will have characterisdc Y."^" Consequendy, the object of the selecdonal precept is not necessarily present in the selecdonal instrucdons themselves. Just like the direcdonal precept, the selecdonal instrucdons themselves are not indexical, but the experience that results from following them IS. Just as Goudge found the direcdonal precept problemadc, he thought the selecdonal precept, taken as an indexical sign to be a mistake. For instance, Goudge says that "the interpretadon Peirce gives to the quandfiers does not yield direcdons of this [(the direcdonal)] kind" (Goudge: 1965, p. 64). Of course, Goudge does not explicitly note the disdncdon between direcdonal and selecdonal precepts. If he did, he would not expect selecdonal precepts to Rincdon in a simple direcdonal manner. However, the problem with modvadng an indexical reading of quandfiers has litde to do with how readily we accept that there are different kinds of precept. The problem has more to do with Peirce's game-theoredc approach to quandficadon, which boils quantificadon down to speaker/hearer interacdon. Arguably, on this reading of quandfiers, it is barely surprising that there is an indexical element given that quandficadon comes down to the contextual choices made by either a speaker or a hearer. As such, Peirce's treatment of selecdonal precepts as indexical comes from his peculiar Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference \77 treatment of quandfiers, which are the main examples of selecdonal precepts. If Peirce were to have a more convendonal reading of quandfiers, he would be less inclined to think of the selecdonal precept as an indexical sign. Jusdfying Peirce's reading of the selecdonal precept as indexical, then, comes down to showing that Peirce's treatment of quandfiers as somehow bound up in the context of speakers is not as alien as it might inidally appear. There are certain feauires of Peirce's reading of quandfiers that other people share but most interesdng and suppordve of a Peircian posidon, though, is recent work by Stanley and Szabo (Stanley ^ Szabo: 2000). They suggest that the domain of a quandfier varies with the context of the noun phrase it takes as argument; this implies sensidvity to, or dependence upon, context. Stanley and Szabo's own example is the statement "Every botde is empty". Depending on the context appropriate to an utterance of this sentence, die domain of bottles will be restricted to, for example, the contents of a botde bank, or a milk crate, rather than all the botdes in the universe. Obviously, this is not what Peirce means by his treatment of quandfiers as precepts, but clearly, he is sensidve to a noted connection between quandfiers used in natural language, and the context in which language users find themselves in using "all" and "some" etc. to indicate and pick out specific objects. Arguably, then, his treatment of selecdonal precepts as indexical signs is not as heterodox as it may first seem. The Broader Picture By using the divisions between signs arising from Peirce's desire to treat proposidonal subjects as indices, we can show that a broader range of indexical signs exists in Peirce's theory, than we could by simply treadng the features as necessary and sufficient condidons. The result is that we have three types of indexical sign. First, there is the index proper, which displays all of the five idendfied features. Examples of this type of indexical sign are natural signs or simple causal indices like the barometer or weathervane. Second, the sub-index, which displays three of the feattires. Examples of this type are indexical words like "I", "here", "now", etc. Finally, we have the direcdonal and selecdonal precept, which displays, with some qualificadon, the same three features as the sub-index. Examples of this type are definite descripdons, common nouns and the universal and existendal quandfiers. This is not all there is to the broader reading offered in this paper though. So far, we have idendfied the three types of indexical sign and explained them in terms of the five idendfied features. In the next secdon, I shall look at a ftirther disdncdon based on the "informadonality" of the sign. As we shall see, this disdncdon does not generate any new types of indexical sign. Rather, it ftirther qualifies each of the three types so that its exemplars are either genuine or degenerate cases of it. 178 Albert Adcin Genuine and Degenerate Indices The final development in my broader reading of Peirce's theory comes from a disdncdon that Peirce makes between two types of index.^' He makes the disdncdon using a bewildering range of names and terminology but the most frequently adopted is the disdncdon between: "designadons", which "merely stand for things or individual quasi-things with which the interpredng mind is already acquainted" and "reagents" which "may be used to ascertain facts" {CV 8.368 fn23 (undated)). "Reagent" is well noted amongst the secondary literature on this subject, ^ however, despite its widespread adopdon, it occurs only once throughout The Collected Papers, and not at all in ne Writings of Charles S. Pî^ The source that I treat as central to understanding the disdncdon comes from Peirce's 1903 Harvard Lectures. It gives a clear statement of the disdncdon and uses the most usefiil and suggesdve terminology; it is worth quodng at length: It is desirable that you should understand clearly the disdncdon between the Genuine and the Degenerate index. The Genuine index represents the duality between the representamen and its object. As a whole it stands for the object; but a part or element of it represents [it] as being the representamen, by being an icon or analogue of the object in some way; and by virtue of that duality, it conveys informadon about the object. [...] Such is the genuine or informadonal index. A Degenerate index is a representamen which represents a single object because it is factually connected with it, but which conveys no informadon whatever. [...] A degenerate index may be called a Monstrative Index, in contradisdncdon to an Informational or Genuine Index. (EP II Ch 12, The Categories Defended, pp. 171-172) This passage is crucial to the account that I develop here and I shall therefore retain the terminology it introduces to mark the disdncdon between two kinds of index: genuine and degenerate. Peirce scholars are already aware of the disdncdon between two kinds of index and so there are standard readings of it. In what follows, then, I look at the standard interpretadon of the disdncdon between genuine and degenerate indices and point out what I think are difficuldes. I then present an aiternadvc reading based upon the nodons of "informadonality" and "iconic involvement". These nodons are present in the passage above but I shall explore them fi.irther below. Further, since I take the disdncdon to be applicable to all three types of Peirce on the Index and Indexicai Reference 179 index as we identified them in the last section, I will also briefly discuss genuine and degenerate indices, genuine and degenerate sub-indices and genuine and degenerate precepts. As such, the genuine/degenerate distinction is less of a fiirther typological distinction and more of a modifying distinction applicable to all three types of indexicai sign. Standard Interpretations There are two readings of the distinction in the secondary literature. The first, and most common, takes the genuine/degenerate dichotomy to consist of a causal relation between sign and object in the case of the genuine index and a referential relation in the case of the degenerate index. In certain moods, Goudge uses this reading and says: "the weathercock is a "reagent" and the pronoun "this" is a designation. The former involves a causal relation with its object, and the later does not" (Goudge: 1965, p. 56). However, the main proponent of the causal/referential reading is Liszka who claims that the distinction is between causal or reagent indices and deictic or referential indices (Liszka: 1996, p, 38).^'' The second reading takes the genuine/degenerate distinction to be between non-verbal and verbal indices. This reading comes from Goudge's non-causal approaches where he suggests that the distinction between genuine and degenerate indices is only pertinent "when [Peirce] takes account of linguistic expressions which ftinction as signs" (Goudge: 1965, p, 55), Goudge later describes "non-verbal signs like a pointing finger or weadiercock", as "genuine or "pure" indices" (Goudge: 1965, p, 65), This suggests that he sees non-verbal cases as genuine indices. Clearly, Goudge is not proposing a causal/referential distinction here since his inclusion of a "pointing finger" within the class of genuine indices includes a non-causal sign. Rather, his reading is to take nonverbal indices as genuine and verbal indices as degenerate. Problems with Standard Interpretations There are problems with these standard readings of Peirce's distinction. Starting with the non-verbal/verbal reading of the distinction, there is a clear example from Peirce's work of a non-verbal degenerate index, Peirce describes Horatio Greenoiigh's Bunker HilP^ Monument as a degenerate index (CP 5,75 (1903)), This is not a linguistic or verbal index. Also, Goudge lists the "pointing finger" as a genuine index because it is non-verbal (Goudge: 1965, p, 65), However, in the same passage as his Bunker Hill Monument example, Peirce clearly states, "a pointing finger is a degenerate index" (loc, cit,). Because of these cases, the non-verbal/verbal interpretation of Peirce's distinction is wrong. The counter examples are not quite so free fiowing for the causal/referential reading though. There are cases of non-causal genuine indices in Peirce's work but these are not as obvious as those that cast doubt upon Goudge's reading. The principle source for these counter examples is (CP 8,368 fn23 (undated)), which gives us two cases of non-causal genuine indices. The first: "the expression 180 Albert Atkin 'two and a half miles'", takes a litde explanadon. Peirce describes this example of a genuine index as "not exacdy a reagent but a descripdon of a reagent."'^* What he means by this is that a rigid bar, or yard sdck, used in measuring some distance, is an index of the Westminster yard bar and so "two and a half miles" describes the use of this index (laid end to end 3770 dmes) to indicate that distance. The worry is this: how is the yardsdck at use in indicadng the object of'two and a half miles' caused by the Westminster yard bar of which it is an index? The Westminster yard bar certainly restricts certain dimensions of the yardsdck, but it is not clear how it "causes" them. The second case from (CP 8.386 fn23 (undated)) is "the scream for help" but Peirce does not offer any discussion of why it is a genuine or causal index. However, Peirce says more about a comparable case. The discussion of indices from (CP 2.287 (1895)) leads to the example of "a driver [who] to attract the attendon of a foot passenger and cause him to save himself, calls out "Hi!"" (loc. cit.). This example is similar enough to the case of a scream for help to be a reagent. What is of interest here is what Peirce says about the object of this index. Peirce takes this case to be "an index, because it is meant to put him [the foot passenger] in real connecdon with the object, which is his situadon reladve to the approaching horse" (loc. cit.). If this is a reagent, then it seems odd to say that its object causes the sign; the cause of the sign seems to be the driver's intendon to warn the pedestrian. This, however, is not the object that Peirce has in mind. The object is the "situadon reladve to the approaching horse" and this does not seem to be a causal feature of the sign-object reladon. This would seem to cast doubt on a causal reading of genuine indices. Perhaps there are important differences between the examples of "Hi" and a "scream for help". However, the cases seem similar enough so that if one is a reagent, then so is the other, and if the reladon between sign and object in one is not essentially c^\.\s-i\ (for Peirce), then the same holds for the other. Alternadvely, perhaps Peirce is wrong about the object of the index in the "Hi" case, and the object is the driver's intendon to warn. I will not argue for or against this point and take Peirce at his word. Instead, I will try to add weight to what I have argued for by suggesdng some difficuldes in delineadng where, and to what extent, causality matters in many cases. Two examples of indices from David Savan (Savan: 1988, p. 38), the Cock's crowing at sunrise and morning reveille, are interesdng for their intuidve similaddes and differences. The dawn is candidate for object in both signs. Further, it seems intuidve that the dawn causesxht cock to crow. Would we make so clear a commitment in the bugler's sounding reveille.' In some sense, the dawn is a cause, but in another, it is the bugler's desire to obey orders, or perhaps the orders themselves, which are the cause of this index of the dawn. This makes the cockcrow and morning reveille different. In the case of the cockcrow, the object causes the sign and so this is a genuine index. In the case of morning reveille, the object of the sign is, at best, part of a broad causal nexus. This suggests that the Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 181 bugler's reveille is degenerate. But are the cock's crowing and morning reveille so different. There are grounds for saying that the causal impetus in the case of the cockcrow is, like morning reveille, also a complexus involving both the dawn and other things not idendcal with the object of the sign. Perhaps habit drives the cockerel, or it feels joy at seeing daylight, or wants to impress the hens. VSHiatever the impetus is, it is not obvious that the causal connecdons are so clear cut in either case so as to exist solely between object and index and to warrant the descripdon of one as genuine and the other degenerate. A furdier blurring of issues comes from asking whether any indexical sign, genuine or degenerate, is devoid of some causal connecdon between it and its object. Cases of degenerate indices like 'this' 'that' 'here' and so on, arguably have a causal connecdon with their object. Imagine that I hear a loud bang and ask, "What is thatV There is some sense in which die object, the bang, causes the use of "diat". Similarly, the connecdon between the locadon of an utterer and his use of "here" to refer to it is not completely devoid of cause. Delineadng the role that causality plays is not an easy task. One final consideradon against the reading of the genuine index as causal is this: Peirce never explicidy uses the term "causal index". There is, of course, common reference to physical connecdon in terms of existential or real relations but it is not clear that this means the connecdon is causal. Liszka treats "causal" and "existendal" as interchangeable (Liszka: 1996, p. 38); Goudge thinks expressions like "'a real connecdon' and 'an existendal reladon' [,.,] have no causal overtones" (Goudge: 1965, p. 55), The causal reading then is problemadc enough to suggest that an alternadve reading might be preferable. Iconic Involvement The impetus behind my alternadve reading comes from Peirce's frequent descripdon of the genuine/degenerate disdncdon in terms of informadonality. He claims that a genuine index not only indicates its object, but provides informadon about it too. A degenerate index, on the other hand, simply indicates without conveying extra informadon.^^ There is some recognidon of the genuine index's informadonality amongst Peirce scholars, ** but it is not this feature per se that modvates my alternadve reading. Rather, it is Peirce's claim that the presence of an icon is essendal for informadonality, the clearest statement of which comes from (CP 5,75 (1903)) where Peirce says, "that by an involved icon, it [an indexical sign] actually conveys information" (Italics mine). This idea of an involved icon as the mechanism by which informadon is conveyed is the crux of the genuine/degenerate disdncdon. The workings of the "involved icon" are not altogether clear, but Peirce makes a few instrucdve comments. At (CP 2,248 (1903)) he says: "[that] in so far as the index is affected by the object, it necessarily has some quality in common with the object, and [...] therefore involve[s] a sort of icon."^^ It 182 Albert Atkin appears that Peirce thinks that, in the case of genuine indices, the sign does not just indicate its object, but also, through some qualitadve commonality that exists between them, conveys informadon about its object too. An example of how this works is the weathervane. The weathervane counts as a genuine index because it shares a quality in common with its object, the wind, namely their direcdon.^" Because of this, the weathervane is able to convey informadon about its object. So, a Southern European weathervane with a veering northward, for example, shows its object to be a wind blowing from the south to the north. Further, from this sharing of a direcdon, the index is able to tell us that the wind is blowing from the North African Sahara. A degenerate index, on the other hand, lacks iconic involvement or a qualitadve connecdon with its object. A poindng finger, for example, stands as an index of the thing it points to; however, the two share no qualides. My finger, poindng to its object, and that object, a man lurking suspiciously on the street comer say, share no appropriate qualides. By attending to the finger, you can glean no informadon about its object, a local criminal. This is because my finger only indicates its object and has no appropriate qualides in common with it. Of course, my finger and the suspicious man are both made of flesh and bone, both have blood running through them and, if the man and I are both unlucky, the index and object are both sore and sdff with arthrids and so, arguably, my finger and the object to which it points do have some qualitadve commonalties. However, these are not the right kind of qualitadve commonality to count as iconic involvement. For the sign and its object to share qualides in a way that suggest iconic involvement, the quality must be due to an affect the object has upon the sign.'' In the case of the weathervane, the causal effect of the wind upon its sign is the underlying reason for the shared quality. In the case of my poindng finger, the qualides are largely accidental and in no way the result of the object affecdng the sign. Iconic involvement, then, is the sharing of a quality between sign and object which, because it comes about as a result of the sign/object reladon, means that informadon can be conveyed about the object. We have already seen how this works on the level of simple indices like the weathervane and poindng finger, but how does this disdncdon apply to the sub index and precept.' If we take the basic list of sub-indices, "I", "here", "now", "this" and "that", something interesdng happens. "I", "here" and "now" seem to be genuine indices and "this" and "that" appear to be degenerate. For instance, "I", "here" and "now", are able to ftincdon as indexical signs largely because of the qualides they share with their objects. " I" works as an index of me, when I use it, because it is my utterance. "Here" works to indicate a locadon because it shares that locadon. "Now" indicates a dme because it shares that dme." "This" and "that", however, differ. "This" and "that" are clearly the subindexical analogue of the poindng finger and any qualitadve connecdon they have with their objects is purely accidental. Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 183 What is interesdng about this is the list of sub-indices I use is Kaplan's list (Kaplan: 1989, pp. 489-91). Kaplan's division of this list into pure indices and demonstradves separates the signs in exacdy the same way that the genuine/ degenerate disdncdon does. Kaplan's pure indices and Peirce's genuine subindices are "I", "here" and "now". BCaplan's demonstradves and Peirce's degenerate sub-indices are "this" and "that."" The disdncdon as it applies to the precept appears to divide the sign into its direcdonal and selecdonal types. The genuine precept is the direcdonal, and the degenerate precept is the selecdonal. For instance, "the greatest living chess player", as a definite descripdon counts as a direcdonal precept. It directs us to an indexical episode that indicates its object. Further, that object largely determines the qualides of the sign, so that the descripdon resembles its object. The qualides of the object determine the nature of the sign. This further provides us with the possibility of gaining informadon about the object, in this case that it plays chess, is alive, etc. Selecdonal precepts on the other hand need not involve the qualides of their objects at all. "All" and "Some", for instance, only appear to indicate how we should select the object, through the choice of either the hearer or the speaker. This renders the selecdonal precept degenerate since no essendal iconic involvement exists. The Effect on the Broader Theory The effect of developing the genuine/degenerate disdncdon and applying it to the three types of indexical sign is that we now have something like a complete account of Peirce's theory of the index and indexical signs. Inidally we have a list of features that an index, taken as an ideal case, v all have. The Index proper has all of these features. The sub-index and both kinds of precept are able to funcdon as indices in virtue of convendon or agreement amongst language users; i.e. they are primarily symbols. Consequendy, they are not ideal examples and do not have all the features that the Index has. Of course, they sdll exemplify some of these features but above all, they all indicate, or show their object, this being the chief Indexical Sign Index Sub-Index Precept Likely Features 1. Significatory 2.Independence 3. Singuladty 4. Indicatory 5. Phenomenological 1. Significatory 3. Singularity 4. Indicatory I. Significatory* 3. Singularity* 4. Indicatory* Genuine Cases "Weather Vane" "I", "Here", "Now" Definite Descriptions Degenerate Cases "Pointing Finger" "This", "That" Quantifiers 184 Albert Atkin fiinction of the index. Finally, we come to the disdnction between genuine and degenerate indices. Genuineness and degeneracy act to modify each of the three types of indexicai sign. What this means is that the Index, Sub-Index and Precept will have both genuine and degenerate forms depending on the level of qualitative or iconic involvement in the way the sign fiinctions as an index. The level of iconic involvement aids the informational capability of the sign. We might summarize the broad reading of Peirce's theory in the following diagram: Concluding Remarks The reading ofi'ered in this paper takes the general analytic view of Peirce's theory to be wrong and in desperate need of re-evaluation. Goudge's account of Peirce's theory in terms of definitional features provides the beginnings of an alternative but takes too narrow a view. The problem is that Goudge's treatment of the features as necessary and sufficient conditions cannot accommodate some of Peirce's examples of indices. Although Goudge provides an alternative to the Burksian reading of analytic theorists, it is still unlikely to lead to a new appreciation of Peirce's theory. The developments in this paper, on the other hand, have a clearly delineable area of interest for modern theorists. Current theories of indexicals appear to focus, in Peircian terms, on the Sub-Index and, to an extent the Precept. Of course, fiirther work is required to show how far Peirce's theory of Sub-Indices and Precepts coincides with current non-Peircian theories of the index. Indeed, it is not clear that Peirce shares all (or any) current interests for a theory of indexicai reference. However, the reading of Peirce's theory provided in this paper gives reason to believe that engaging with Peirce's account of the index might be a fmitfiil course of research in investigating current concerns in indexicai reference.^* Glasgow University, Scodand A.Atkin@philosophy,arts,gla,ac,uk REFERENCES Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua 1970 Aspects of Language: Essays and Lectures on Tlie Philosopljy of Language, Linguistic Philosophy and Methodology of Linguistics. (Jerusalem: Magnes), Burks, Arthur 1949 "Icon, Index, Symbol", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research Vol, IX: 673-689, Evans, Gareth 1982 The Varieties of Reference. John McDowell (ed,), (Oxford: O,U,P,), Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 185 Gale, Richard 1967 "Indexical Signs, Egocentric Pardculars, and Token-Reflexive Words". ITie Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 4:151-155. Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel 1998 "Indexicals as Token-Reflexives". Mind, 107; 529-563. Goudge, Thomas A. 1965 "Peirce's Index". Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. I, No 2: 52-70. Hilpinen, Risto 1983 "On C.S. Peirce's Theory of the Proposidon: Peirce as a Precursor of Game-Theoretical Semantics". In The Relevance of Charles Peirce. Eugene Freeman (ed.). 1983 (La Salle, IL: Monist Library of Philosophy). 1995 "Peirce on Language and Reference". In Peirce and Contemporary Thought. Kenneth Laine Ketner (ed.). 1995 (New York: Fordham University Press). Hintikka, Jaako 1979 "Quandfiers in Logic and Quandfiers in Naniral Language". In GameTheoretical Semantics. Esa Saadnen (ed.). 1979. (Dordrecht: Reidel) Hookway, Chdstopher J. 1985 Peirce. (London: Roudedge). Kaplan, David 1969 "Quantifying In". In Words and Objections. D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.). 1969. (Dordrecht: Reidel). 1978 "Dthat". In Demonstratives. Palle Yourgrau (ed.). 1990. (Oxford: O. U.P.). 1979 "On the Logic of Demonstratives". The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8,81-89. 1989a "Demonstradves". In Themesfiom Kaplan. Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (eds.). 1989. (Oxford: O.U.P.). 1989b "Afterthoughts". In Tfjemesfiom Kaplan. Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (eds.). 1989. (Oxford: O.U.P.). Liszka, James J. 1996 A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press). Peirce, Gharles S. 1931-36 Collected Papers. Volumes 1-6. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.). (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 1958 Collected Papers. Volumes 7 & 8. Arthur Burks (ed.). (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 1998 The Essential Peirce. Vol. 2. The Peirce Edition Project (eds.). (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press). Perry, John 1995 "Refle.\ivity, Indexicality and Names". In 77;e Problem of the Essential Indexical (Expanded Edition). John Perry. 2000 (Stanford, CA: CSLI). 2001 Reference and Refiexivity.(Sx.-!Ln?orA, Ch.CSU). 186 Albert Atkin Reichenbach, Hans 1947 Elements of Symbolic Logic. (New York: Free Press). Russell, Bertrand 1918 "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", In Logic and Knowledge. 1956. (London: Marsh). Savan, David. 1988 An Introduction to C.S. Peirce's Full System of Semeiotic. (Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle). Sebeok, Thomas A. 1995 "Indexicality". In Peirce and Contemporary 'Thought. Kenneth Laine Ketner (ed.). 1995 (New York: Fordham University Press). Stanley, Jason and Szabo, Zoltan 2000 "On Quantifier Domain Restriction", Mind and language, 15: 219261. NOTES 1. We are, of course, ignoring Russell's (1918) definition of egocentric particulars'^ terms of the logically proper name this. This is only because Russell's main concern in this account is in establishing his claim that proper names are definite descriptions, rather than establishing a thorough going account of indexicals. 2. It strikes me that Kaplan inherits this view about the terminological safety of "index" from Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1970, p. 79) who says that he uses Peirce's term indexical because "it provides an adjective easily combined with 'sign', 'word', 'expression', 'sentence', 'language' and 'communication' alike". The suggestion that Peirce's terminology is best used for issues of grammatical ease and theoretical neutrality is, I think, a clear statement of contemporary understanding of Peirce's theories of the index and inde.xical reference. 3. It was Burks' editorship of the final two volumes of The Collected Papers in 1958 that, by and large, completed our access to Peirce's work, but obviously, Burks' 1949 paper precedes this. 4. For instance, Richard Gale (Gale: 1967, p. 151) inherits Burks' criticisms wholesale. Similarly, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (Garcia-Carpintero: 1998, pp, 532-533) takes Burks' criticisms as damming and uses that reading of Peirce as a foil for introducing Reichenbachian token-reflexivity. And one particularly interesting example of this inheriting of Burks' reading is in recent work by John Perry (Perry: 1995 and 2001), Perry develops an account of indexical reference based on Burks' (1949), but, because of Burks' reading, seems to make little reference to Peirce's account except as something of a Burksian precursor and general non-starter. 5. For instance, David Savan (Savan: 1988, p. 36), and James Jac6b Liszka (Liszka: 1996, p. 38 fn33) recently cite Goudge's paper as the authority and treat it as the final word on the subject. 6. See, (CP 2.248 (cl903)), (CP 3.361 (1885)), (CP 4.531 (1906)), (CP 5.75 (1903)), (CP 5.287 (1868)), (CP 8.368 fn. 23 (undated)), (CP 1,369 (1885)), (CP 2.285 (1893)), (CP 2.286 (1893)), (CP 2.287 (1893)), (CP 4,56 (1893)), (CP 8.41 (1885)), (CP 8.350 (1908)). 7. See, (CP 4.447 (1903)), (CP 5.73 (1901)). 8. See, (CP 1.369 (1885)), (CP 2.283 (1902)), (CP 2.305 (1901)). Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference 187 9. See, (CP 1.369 (1885)), (CP 2.291 (1893)), (CP 3.361 (1885)), (CP 4.56 (1893)), (CP 8.41 (1885)). 10. See, (CP 2.305 (1901)), (CP 2.306)). 11. See (CP 2.283 (1902)) for instance. 12. For instance, Goudge's third feature and my independence feature are die same in that they both concern the reality of the index. However, Peirce defines "the real" in at least two ways. One is as resistance and reaction and is the definition that Goudge notices. The other is as independence from thought or whatever men may think of it and is the definition behind my reading. Goudge's account of this feature and mine are essentially the same point approached differently. Indeed, the two types of definition for the real are found together on occasion. For example, Peirce says diat "an index is a representamen [...] by virtue of a character which it could not have if its object did not exist, but which it will continue to have just the same whether it be interpreted as a representamen or nô' (CP 5.73 (1901)), (italics mine). 13. This is the crux of Burks' criticism of Peirce. For Burks, if the index is causal and dyadic, it is not behaving as a sign, which is essentially triadic. 14. This is Goudge's own strategy against Burks' when he says tliat "Peirce is vulnerable to Burks' objection in retaining the idea of cause-effect relation between index and object in at least some cases where these items are taken in abstraction from a concrete semiotic situation" (Goudge: 1965, p. 55). 15. Goudge (1965: pp. 60-65) suggests that Peirce's insistence on treadng the subject term as an index leads to a breech of certain definitional features which force Peirce to make a range of ad hoc moves to keep his theodes together. Amongst the moves that Goudge thinks Peirce is forced to make is his theory of precepts and a gametheoretical reading of quantifiers. The rest of this secdon aims to show that Peirce is not forced to develop these theories, but readily adopts them. 16. See, for instance, (Hilpinen 1995, p. 291). 17. Of course, we are already aware that definite descriptions count as directional precepts. 18. See (CP 2.289 (1895)) where Peirce lists "universal selcctives such as [...] any, every, all, no, none whatever, whoever, everybody, anybody, nobody" and " particular selectives [...] some, something, somebody, a, a certain, some or other, a suitable, one" as examples of selecdve precepts. 19. See (Hilpinen: 1995, §IX XI) and (Hilpinen: 1983) for more on Peirce's early game-theoredc approach to quantifiers. Further, see Hindkka (1979) for an example of his later and more thoroughgoing game-theoretic approach to quantifiers. 20. Obviously, the list of directions will be longer than this and contain some indication of how to find X's. 21. See, for instance (CP 2.283 (1902)), (CP 4.531 (1905)) (CP 5.75 (1903)) (CP 8.368 fn23 (undated)). 22. See, for instance (Savan: 1988, p. 38), (Liszka: 1996, p. 38) (Sebeok: 1995, pp. 224-226)). 23. This conclusion is just from my own searches. Others may find reference to reagents in the context of indexicals where I have not. The main point, though, is that Peirce's use of "reagents" is minimal. 24. Liszka claims a third kind too, which he calls labeling. I am not convinced that he has a case for claiming a third kind of distincdon and find his examples of this from Peirce, ((CP 2.329(cl902)), (CP 2.285 (cl895)) and (CP 3.361(1885)) to 188 Albert Atkin be cases of Genuine and Degenerate indices, however, I do not want to argue this point here. 25. The Battle of Bunker Hill was a battle of the American Revolution fought over two hills. Bunker Hill and Breed's Hill, on June 17, 1775 in Charlestown, Boston Massachusetts. It is femous for marking the realisation that well entrenched and organised American militia could withstand larger British numbers. A commemorative obelisk (the Bunker Hill Monument), designed by Horatio Greenough, now stands on the site where the batde took place. 26. Recall that "reagent" is one of Peirce's many names for what we are calling a genuine index. 27. Peirce suggests these points in the third 1903 Harvard lecture (see EP II Ch. 12, pp. 171-172 quoted above) and at various points throughout the Collected Papers ((CP 2.231 (1910)), (CP 5.75 (1903)) (CP 5.76 (1903)). The use of "reagent" in (CP 8.368 fn23 (undated)) is meant to suggest informadonality, as is the use of "informational index" as an alternative term for genuine indices in EP II Ch 12 pp 171172. 28. Liszka (Liszka: 1996, pp. 38-39) and Sebeok (Sebeok: 1995, pp. 224225) both recognize informadonality as a feature of the genuine index. Liszka suggests that the ability to convey information is due to the causal connection between "reagent" and object (op. cit.) but does not explain why. 29. See also, (CP 5.75 1903)) and EPII, pp. 170-71 for further comment by Peirce about the nature of iconic involvement. 30. Of course, this sharing of a quality does not mean that the weathervane is an iconic sign of its object; the shared quality does not play a role in the vveathervane's standing for its object and so the sign remains an index. However, because this shared quality exists, Peirce maintains that as well as indicating its object, the weathervane is able to convey information also. 31. See (CP 2.248 (1903)). 32. Of course, the sharing of qualities is not the only reason these signs indicate their object, their status as symbols with an agreed upon use contributes significantly too. 33. Clearly, the list of sub-indices is larger than this and the immediate similarities between Kaplan's division and Peirce's may come apart with further investigation of them. Also, I am only claiming that any similarities between Kaplan's and Peirce's account rests in the way the signs divide; Peirce's reasons for making the division and Kaplan's appear to be unrelated. 34. Special thanks to Chris Hookway and Jenny Saul who read and commented on various drafts of this paper. Also, thanks to Nathan Houser for a copy of his M.A. thesis and for suggesting worthwhile work on Peirce's notion of degeneracy.